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Oligopolistic Suppliers, Symbiotic Value Chains and Workers’ Bargaining Power 
Labor contestation in South China at an ascendant global footwear firm 
 
This paper examines a 2014 strike in South China of Taiwanese footwear giant Yue Yuen to 
analyze changes in the power relationship between lead firms, manufacturers and workers. The 
paper demonstrates a connection between increased labor costs and capital consolidation and 
greater value capture at the bottom of the global supply chain. It is argued that footwear value 
chains are undergoing a falling degree of monopsony power and an emergence of enormous 
oligopolistic suppliers, transforming the power imbalances of global supply chains towards a 
more mutually dependent ‘buyer-producer symbiosis’. The Yue Yuen strike uncovers a maturing 
industrial working class and pressures on social reproduction in China, adapting its bargaining 
strategies vis-à-vis the developmental state. Influxes of profit raise the ceiling for what can be 
demanded of employers, stimulating those same employers to pursue more aggressive means 
of holding onto their profits. The example of the Yue Yuen strike is an indicator of what are 
fundamental changes in the production process, dynamics within the value chain, and power 
and agency of workers in labor-intensive production. The strike demonstrates that consolidation 
is playing a decisive role in shaping the power relationship between domestic manufacturers 
and transnational brands, this, in turn, directly affects the bargaining power of workers. 
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China’s industrial capacity has outpaced labor, causing a pronounced power shift, since 
‘bosses are short of workers and workers are short of patience’ (The Economist 2010) 
despite reports of a manufacturing downturn in 2012 following a two-year strike wave 
(Barboza 2012). The export-oriented industrial provinces of Guangdong and Zhejiang in 
South China have become a hotbed of worker unrest (Silver and Zhang 2009), and, 
since strikes are not permitted within the law, have made China the site of more wildcat 
strikes than any other country in the world (Friedman 2015). And as labor shortage and 
worker pressure mounted employers were forced to accommodate, allowing real wages 
to rise more than 7% per annum.1 Workers often succeeded in wresting double-digit 
salary increases from their employers (Friedman 2014). Indeed, ‘by the end of 2010, 
Chinese media commentators were [already] declaring that the era of low-wage labor 
had come to an end’ (Friedman 2012).   
I examine the 2014 strike at Yue Yuen in China, the largest strike at a single 
private company in contemporary Chinese history, which resulted in $27m in losses to 
the company due to the disruption of the strike as well as $31m in concessions to 
workers. The strike contributes to ongoing theoretical debates that caste value chains 
within labor-intensive sectors, such as shoes, clothing, furniture, and consumer 
electronics, as decidedly ‘buyer-driven’. I argue that firms, adapting from assembly-only 
                                                          
1 This is also state policy, in part due to pressure from labor, but also as a strategy to steer the Chinese economy into a more ‘value-
added’, technologically advanced direction (The Economist 2010). 
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affairs to integrated oligopolistic suppliers, transformed previously asymmetrical power 
imbalance between global brands (‘buyers’) to producers (‘suppliers’) to a more 
symbiotic relationship.  
Enhanced value-capture by firms at the production-end may also, past a certain 
point, bridge the divide separating value capture from value creation in the footwear 
sector, calling into question established value chain theories, and bringing new 
emphasis to labor tactics against their direct employers. Indeed, underdeveloped in 
Global Value Chain (GVC) literature is an analysis the supply chain as dialectical and 
evolving due to an underlying logic. This logic is outlined in the model of GVCs mapped 
in Galanis and Kumar (2018). Whereas typologies developed in Sturgeon (2001; 2003), 
Humphrey and Schmitz (2002), Palpacaur (2000) Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 
(2005), and others are helpful indicators of changes in the GVC they are implicitly fixed 
categories. However, the symbiotic state described here builds upon and goes beyond 
these categories by treating the value chain as evolving and dynamic leading to shifting 
value distribution, power relations, and firm oligopsony/oligopoly. Ultimately, the 
symbiotic state leads to the lead firm needing to counter its profitability crisis through a 
radical spatial, technological, organizational or other some other kind of reorientation. 
Indeed, this paper should be read as the first empirical case study that applies the GVC 
model outlined in Galanis and Kumar (2018). 
I attempt to expand the GVC approach, which takes the interactions, power, and 
governance of the range of activities involved in the garment commodity from extraction, 
manufacture, design, and marketing, to retail. The Yue Yuen strike reveals that the 
actions of workers, domestic manufacturer and transnational capital are both 
antagonistic and symbiotic and cannot be delinked from national labor relations regime. 
This counters the dominant value chain analysis , which tends to downplay the role of 
the state. I argue that the growth of supplier-end firms into larger, integrated firms, 
throwing their weight into higher value activities, affects not only the relationship 
between buyers and suppliers by deepening embeddedness leading to greater 
upgrading on the shop floor, enhancing the bargaining power of workers to exact a 
larger share of value from their now value-laden direct employer. Ultimately, a crisis in 
social reproduction of an aging Chinese working class coupled with the combined 
development of rising costs, state interventions, value chain consolidation and the 
extinction of small firms—brought the struggle back to the point of production and the 
workers themselves.  
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The paper is structured into three sections: conceptual framework, the case 
study of Yue Yuen, and results. I describe the hitherto power dynamics within the 
garment sector, which I then contest by outlining the developments in Chinese labor 
relations, the emergence of large firms in Asia, and the relationship between this 
structure and workers’ agency through the case study of Yue Yuen and the 2014 labor 
strike. The study is based on a combination of sources including news reports from on 
the ground, detailed accounts on the strike from Hong Kong-based NGOs, as well as 
five key informant phone interviews conducted with NGO workers at Hong Kong-based 
organizations. Company data was retrieved from Yue Yuen’s annual financial 
statements at the Hong Kong Stock Exchange of which Yue Yuen is listed (retrieved 
through Capital IQ corporate database). 
 
Power and Value 
The process of ‘globalization’ has seen sectors with high variable capital — toys, 
garments, footwear, etc.— relocate production from the global North to the Global 
South. This globalized ‘race to the bottom’ intensified the asymmetry between producers 
and buyers (Ahmed and Nathan 2016, Hale and Wills 2005b, Armbruster-Sandoval 
2004, Kreider 2000). In the 1990s, Gary Gereffi (1994) and others began to advance the 
theory of Global Commodity Chains (GCC), noting the existence of global ‘buyers’ 
(transnational brands and major retailers), which maintained a high degree of control in 
spite of globally dispersed and outsourced ‘producers’. Globalized brands exercised a 
high Degree of Monopsony Power (DMP), or ologopsony power, over producers through 
their ability to select from a large pool of outside firms for almost every phase of the 
value chain — textiles, production, transportation, processing, warehousing, etc. — to 
capture the lion share of the value in the garment and footwear industries.2 Suppliers 
unable to reach the price demands of these transnational brands risked the loss of 
orders or even closure. This dependence left manufacturers in a state of perpetual 
instability, unable to muster the capital necessary to escape the orbit of brand power 
                                                          
2 Garment and footwear production have fundamental differences. Footwear tariffs were loosened in the 1980s and thus have greater 
consolidation at country and firm levels in production, consumption, and assemblage relative to garments. For example 90% of 
Athletic footwear are produced in 3 countries (Merk 2014) while garments are far more globally dispersed. Both footwear and garment 
sectors are identified as ‘low-technology, labor-intensive’ (Scott 2006; Gereffi 2009), ‘buyer-driven’ (Gereffi 1994; Schmitz and 
Knorringa 2000), and are used interchangeably in studies (see Miller 2004; Schmitz 2006). Additionally, analysis of footwear may 
foretell changes within apparel, which remained more globally dispersed through the MFA until it was phased-out 2005 potentially 
delaying both country and firm consolidation. 
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and pursue their own development, with the possibility of losing a purchasing contract 
an inexorable existential threat3.  
The footwear value chain has remained labor-intensive and vertically 
disintegrated for the past half century and as globalization intensified these dynamics 
were transformed from domestic to global production and consumption (Herrigel and 
Zeitlin 2010). With twenty-one billion shoes – or about three pairs for every person on 
the planet – produced in 2017 the global footwear industry is expected to growing 
sharply – at least 5.1% - over the next decade  (Singh 2017). Brands and large retailers 
have maximized profits by throwing manufacturers into bidding wars. Factory owners, in 
order to stay afloat and respond to competitive demands, increased downward pressure 
on workers. Consequently factory-floor workers always straddled the poverty-line as 
workplace conditions deteriorated. The concentration of capital at the top of the supply 
chain — Nike and Adidas, for instance, control over 50% of the global athletic shoe 
market (Merk 2008) —only served to further entrench this structure, which remains a 
key obstacle to greater workers’ bargaining power in the sector (Moran 2010, Hale and 
Wills 2005b, Armbruster-Sandoval 2004, Ross 2004).  
Gereffi's (2002) theory draws a distinction between the ‘buyer-driven’ chains of 
labor-intensive production and ‘producer-driven’ chain in capital-intensive production. 
He states that, ‘producer-driven chains usually belong to international oligopolies. 
Buyer-driven value chains, by contrast, are characterized by highly competitive and 
globally decentralized factory systems with low barriers to entry in production.’ Gereffi 
(1994) posited that footwear, as a labor-intensive sector, maintained a ‘buyer-driven’ 
value-chain. Schmitz and Knorringa (2000, 3) empirically supported Gereffi’s theory of 
footwear, finding that ‘big buyers […] are the key players.’ Yet, despite these early 
theories, the past decade has seen an increased recognition of the complexity of inter-
firm relationships. More recently, Gereffi et al (2005) go beyond the buyer and producer-
driven binary, proposing a five-part typology to value-chain governance taking account 
of the evolving nature of Global Value Chains (GVC) and upgrading potential. Gereffi’s 
                                                          
3 Notably, Henderson, Dicken, Hess, Coe, and Yeung (2002) develop a framework to account for the development of ‘strategic alliances’ 
between firms (‘relational rents’) taking account of contextual conditions, technological and licensing agreements, and lead firm 
strategies to confront the contradiction of place and global flows. To Henderson et al (2002) the GCC dualism relies too heavily on 
barriers to entry within particular sectors, treats the production and distribution process as linear, limits itself to existing chains, and 
lacks recognition of state and local policy in firm development. 
 5 
(2014) most recent research goes further in announcing a new phase of global 
governance structures and recognizes the growing consolidation of contractor firms 
such as Foxconn in electronics, Li & Fung in apparel, and Yue Yuen in footwear, with 
larger suppliers exerting greater pressure against buyers.  
This paper contributes to ongoing debates by introducing ‘buyer-producer 
symbiosis’ as a formation of evolving power between actors in the global supply chain. 
While the typologies proposed by Gereffi et al. (2005) updates theories developed by 
Gereffi (1994, 2002) they remained static and too homogenising with geographical, 
social and institutional specificities unaccounted for. The GPN literature, responding to 
this critique, added much needed complexity by understanding global governance as a 
multifactorial and contingent process. A GPN is defined as ‘the nexus of interconnected 
functions, operations and transactions through which a specific product or service is 
produced, distributed and consumed’ (Coe, Dicken, and Hess, 2008, p. 272) performed 
by firm and non-firm actors, like regional, national and international institutions, labour 
groups and relevant stakeholders.  
With these critiques in mind, a succeeding version of the GPN framework, GPN 
2.0 (Yeung and Coe, 2015), reframed the GPN-GVC approaches. Yeung and Coe 
(2015) highlight the ‘structural competitive dynamics’ and the ‘actor-specific strategies’ 
that shape and control production networks. Instead of the three determining factors 
(transactions complexity, information codifiability and supply capabilities) found in 
Gereffi et al. (2005), Yeung and Coe (2015) introduce three ‘structural competitive 
dynamics’, the optimization of the ratio between costs and production capabilities, the 
market development and financial discipline, which generate, under uncertain and risky 
conditions, four distinct corporate ‘strategies’ which bear resemblance to governance 
structures. 
For the GPN approach, power is tightly connected to the influence firms, 
institutions and stakeholders, exert over other actors in a production network. Thus, 
power is related to decision-making and resource allocation, in which additional 
bargaining power is sourced from an actor’s position in a production network 
(Henderson et al., 2002; Dougherty, 2008; Yeung and Coe, 2015). On the other hand, 
labour, as an active agent of production with the potential to exert and demand a 
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significant amount of bargaining power, is, to a large extent, at best absent and worst 
passive within the analytical frameworks of GCC, GVC and GPN, despite the latter’s 
attempt to formalise the power of labour unions in the “conceptual category” of 
“collective power”.   
Buyer-producer symbiosis fills this lacuna by recognizing the evolutionary and 
dynamic power relationship in the GVC between large buyers and large suppliers. 
Similar to Gereffi’s (1994), ‘buyer-producer symbiosis’ is not limited to the calculable 
relationship (i.e. transaction costs) between buyer and producer but resembles one-half 
of Gereffi’s (1994, 95) original formulation which was to, ‘show how ‘big buyers’ have 
shaped the production networks in the world’s most dynamic exporting countries, 
especially in the newly industrialized countries of East Asia’. As Starosta (2010, 437) 
stated, ‘the concept of governance was originally devised to depict the diversity of 
authority and power relationships that give overall coordination to the division of labor 
within the value chain’. In this vein, the introduction of ‘symbiosis’ is an observation of 
the power relationship, through an analysis inter alia of changes in structure, 
technology, and territoriality, as the consequence of the emergence of giant capitals on 
either side of the footwear GVC. Tied to the logic outlined in Galanis and Kumar (2018), 
deregulation leads to high DMP, which increases the share of value to the lead firm. 
This intensifies competition, which, through downward pressure, reduces the number of 
suppliers able to compete and shrinking DMP. Falling DMP increases the consolidation 
of supplier firms, increasing the share of value to the supplier and raises barriers to 
entry. Thus moving the value chain towards a symbiotic steady state with oligopolistic 
firms at either end of the chain. 
A move towards low DMP catalyzes consolidation and technological investment 
and reduces the spatial flexibility of lead firms. Historically, global brands in footwear 
resorted primarily to, what Harvey (2006) calls, a ‘spatial fix’ rather than a ‘technological 
fix.’ Indeed, this was central to the historic growth strategy of global brands and 
retailers. These various ‘fixes’ represent the intrinsic mechanism by capital to overcome 
its inherent crisis tendency. This structure results in low surplus value at the production 
phase of the supply chain, ensuring chronically low capital investment in industrial 
upgrading, and low bargaining power for workers. A move away from this relation may 
have the opposite affect on workers’ bargaining power.  
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In short: Low capital investment in manufacturing creates low barriers to entry, 
resulting in bidding wars between thousands of smaller firms from around the world 
(Mahutga 2012; Gereffi 2002). Global brands and retailers tend to reward firms with the 
lowest labour costs, resulting in persistent downward pressure on workers (Anner, Bair, 
and Blasi 2012). Thus the footwear value chain is ‘buyer-driven’ (Gereffi 2002), insofar 
as brands and retailers command it. Within this asymmetrical power relationship, worker 
action or organization results in order-loss, and so the global ‘race to the bottom’ must 
entail labor discipline (Kumar 2014). The structure of the footwear value chain draws 
value to the top of the supply chain, to global brands and retailers. Thus power of labor 
in the footwear value chain has been curtailed (Hale and Wills 2005). Finding 
themselves thrown out of work by pyrrhic victories over factory owners, and too isolated 
to pressure international brands, workers have appealed often to ‘anti-sweatshop’ allies 
in the Global North to increase sourcing prices to manufacturers and make them more 
responsible for labor rights (Kumar and Mahoney 2014). Thus the spatial and political 
distanciation between areas of value creation and value capture left workers without a 
means of direct resistance that the Global North-based anti-sweatshop movement 
attempted to partly ameliorate, specifically by attempting to relocate the site of struggle 
from the sphere of production to the sphere of consumption (Kreider 2000; Ross 2004; 
Hale and Wills 2005).  
However, these dynamics are changing. Labor shortage in South China is 
reverberating across the value chain4. This transition from labor surplus to labor 
shortage (sector-specific or otherwise) is part of a labor-market squeeze which is 
reflected in the events at Yue Yuen. This paper analyses the emergence of an 
‘organizational fix’, vertical and horizontal expansion, signaling a lurch away from the 
‘spatial fix’, which was integral to absorbing garment capital crisis tendencies for the 
past century.  Simply put, when supplier firms grow, they purchase technologies and 
expand, often along the supply chain, erecting new barriers of entry as they grow, and 
thereby fundamentally changing the relations between producers and suppliers, workers 
and their employers. 
The Chinese State and Labor-Capital Relations 
                                                          
4 China’s labor shortage is not uncontested. Elfstrom and Kuruvilla (2014) maintain growing labor shortage is driving labor unrest, while 
others argue that shortages are specific to labor-intensive GVCs (Cai 2015). 
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China has emerged as an economic superpower, following ‘probably the most 
remarkable economic transformation in history’ (Stiglitz 2006, 1), and is expected to 
surpass the U.S. GDP by 2019 (Peck and Zhang 2013). Whilst neither embedded 
neoliberalism nor embedded socialism (Peck and Zhang 2013), Anner (2015, 292) 
categorizes China as an ‘authoritarian state labor regime’ because of its control of both 
legal and extra-legal apparatuses aimed at limiting independent worker organization. To 
Anner (2015) the efficacy of this regime explains China’s dominance of global apparel 
and footwear production despite wages at four times that of neighboring Bangladesh.  
Yet, China’s labor unrest continues to grow. This phenomenon cannot be 
delinked from the changing relationship between the state and capital. Friedman (2015) 
argues that since 2010 there has been a weakening of the alliance between global 
capital and the Chinese state in the repression of strikes. He claims that both the 
Chinese central government and Guangdong provincial authorities sought a new means 
of accumulation and were even willing to ally with workplace radicals to realize these 
aims. At the same time, the central government continues to intensify its opposition to 
civil society by restricting the bounds of official tolerance, especially against labor rights-
related individuals and NGOs (Jacobs and Buckley 2015)5.  
 Strikes also make visible the internal tensions of the state. The shift away from a 
centrally planned economy in 1970s empowered increasingly autonomous provinces to 
institute market reforms. The result was a race to the bottom with the most ‘successful’ 
provinces serving as ‘models’ and promoted across China (Friedman and Kuruvilla 
2015). Decentralization has fostered a space in which capital remains meaningfully 
autonomous from a central state while integrating itself into the provincial government. 
This, in part, explains the differentiated reactions by national and provincial officials, 
mirrored in the official union All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), to the Yue 
Yuen strike. The ACFTU is integral to the central government’s changes in labor 
relations such as collective bargaining.  
 Despite an immense body of work on industrialization and the developmental 
state the relationship between export processing and the state has remained 
undertheorized, particularly in China. Smith (2014) argues that the role of the state 
should not be relegated to policy functions but situated within a wider analysis of 
accumulation given its central to the development process of the firm and the GVC. 
                                                          
5 Zhang Zhiru, who operates a Shenzhen-based labor rights organization and was the principle legal consult to the Yue Yuen workers on 
strike, was forced to close his organization after police intimidation. 
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Indeed, the explosive growth of Asian firms in China is a consequence of the conscious 
interventions by the Chinese state (Woo 1991; Kohli 2004), through market distortion 
(Amsden 1989), industrial policy from import substitution to export oriented (Stubbs 
1999) with the state often taking the role of entrepreneur (Amsden 1989) or state-driven 
globalization through joint ventures (Huang 2003). For example, Ngai and Chan (2012: 
385) maintain that the state facilitated mergers, acquisitions, and geographic expansion 
to help transform Apple supplier Foxconn in the direction of a firm with monopolistic 
characteristics that ‘it now dominates the global market’. This process shares similarities 
with the growth of Yue Yuen.  However, Yeung (2014) maintains that inter-firm dynamics 
and the process of strategic coupling in East Asia command domestic firms, which are 
gradually dis-embedding themselves from the developmental state and re-embedding 
themselves within different GPNs. In the case of Yue Yuen we find a firm moving 
towards a more mutually dependent embedded interfirm relation – symbiosis – 
profoundly circumscribed by the developmental goals of the Chinese state. 
Emergence of Large Labor-Intensive Firms in Asia 
There are a number of studies in consolidation of capital-intensive firms, however 
research in consolidation in labor-intensive GVCs is limited (notable exceptions include 
Merk 2008; Gereffi 2013; Azmeh and Nadvi 2014; Appelbaum 2008). Milberg and 
Winker (2010) maintain that geographic consolidation, both horizontally and vertically, 
became even more pronounced in ‘buyer-driven’ value chains since the 2008 global 
financial crisis. In the labor-intensive footwear sector tariffs were relaxed in the 1980s, 
which is one explanation for the consolidation of buyers and suppliers firms in the 
1990s.  
Concentration of production in fewer countries was accompanied by 
consolidation of capital in the hands of fewer firms (Azmeh and Nadvi 2014). In what 
Nolan, Zhang and Liu (2008) label the ‘cascade effect’, global industrial concentration 
across the value chain has grown since the 1980s due to intense downward pressure 
by large buyers. Nolan, Zhang and Liu (2008: 45) demonstrate that ‘at every level there 
has taken place an intense process of industrial concentration, mainly through merger 
and acquisition, as firms struggle to meet the strict requirements that are the condition 
of their participation in the system integrators’ supply chains.’ Through the active 
selection of the most capable suppliers, buyers adopt ‘aligned suppliers’, and what 
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follows, as we see in the case of Yue Yuen, is the eventual growth of some preferred 
suppliers who corner significant proportions of the sector.  
 In the post-Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) period, garment producers based in 
Asia have grown apace; Korea-based Yupoong Inc., has become the world’s largest 
producer of hats, Datang is now responsible for more than a third of the world’s sock 
output, Tawain-based Nien Hsing, has reached the summit of denim production; and 
Panarub, in Indonesia, is Adidas’ exclusive cleats manufacturer. As Richard Appelbaum 
(2008, 70) notes, ‘we are now entering an era in which a qualitatively higher degree of 
integration between production and distribution has begun to reshape the entire buyer-
driven global commodity chain…[that are]… altering the relationship between 
‘manufacturer’ on the one hand and ‘retail buyer’ on the other.’ Changes in the 
production process are a reaction to changes in the labor market, which in turn prefigure 
new oppositional forces. 
 Gereffi (2009) notes that China has undergone unprecedented development by 
leveraging its abundant and low-cost labor, land, electricity and raw materials, taking the 
lead in upgrading in a number of industries with high and medium-technology exports 
outpacing low-technology by around 2008. The emergence of large-scale production 
and place-specific value-chain agglomeration has led to the FDI-driven clusters of what 
has been called ‘supply chain cities’ primarily in Guangdong and Zhejiang and strategic 
coupling between TNCs, provincial governments, and their outsourced manufacturers. 
‘[Supply chain cities] bring together multiple parts of the firm’s supply chain—designers, 
suppliers, and manufacturers—so as to minimize transaction costs, take advantage of 
economies of scale, and foster more flexible supply chain management’ (Gereffi 2008, 
46). Gereffi (2009) argues that foreign-led clusters concentrated in the South China 
provinces of Guangdong and Fujian mainly in low-cost manufacturing sectors such as 
textiles and apparel due primarily to government policy, low-cost labor, and relative 
proximity to major transportation centers. 
The strike at Yue Yuen facilities confirms that Yue Yuen ‘has emerged as a major 
economic powerhouse’ (Applebaum 2008, 73) and is rapidly attaining oligopolistic 
power. Oligopoly power, or popular referred to as Monopoly power, is not meant to imply 
a single seller exercising sole proprietorship of a market (a rare phenomenon), but, as is 
in economic parlance, denotes a phase of capitalist development in which giant firms 
‘limit new competitors entering the industry, even if there are high profits’ (Foster, 
McChesney, and Jonna 2011). The monopoly firm has an incredible capacity to 
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generate profits assisted by economies of scale and scope (Baran and Sweezy 1969, 
52. I use Yue Yuen as an ‘ideal type’ (to borrow Max Weber’s expression)6 not to 
highlight the exceptional but, as Baran and Sweezy (1969, 15) aptly state, ‘the ideal 
type will display with sharpness and clarity what may appear in everyday economic life 
in a disguised form, difficult to recognize and easy to misinterpret.’ The Yue Yuen strike 
and brand reaction demonstrates the burgeoning power of oligopolistic suppliers vis-à-
vis oligopolistic brands as well as workers vis-à-vis suppliers. Yue Yuen to influence the 
sector in fundamental ways comes through a combination of the strength of its 
productive capacity relative to its competitors and the scale, size, and mutual-
dependence of its buyers.  
Workers’ Unrest and Oligopoly Power 
The labor unrest escalating in China since 2004 has been the subject of extensive 
reportage and research (Friedman 2012; Silver and Zhang 2009). In the first quarter of 
2014 China Labour Bulletin, a leading Hong Kong-based rights group, recorded 319 
strikes in China, a 30% increase from year-to-year, mostly in the manufacturing sector. 
Efstrom and Kuruvilla (2014: 454) find that, ‘Chinese workers are increasingly using 
strikes and protests proactively to demand higher wages, better working conditions, and 
increased respect from employers.’  As a consequence of the labor shortage, changes 
in state policy, and workers’ agitation, wages have increased by 7% per annum and 
Chinese capital is losing its labor cost advantage. The new era of competition has 
thinned the herd, leaving larger amalgamated firms with enhanced production-side 
value capture (Azmeh and Nadvi 2014). These dominant firms have reinvested into 
laboursaving technology, deepening their advantages in Chinese clothing and footwear 
production (Zhu and Pickles 2014). 
Labor-intensive industrial firms within Guangdong Province, the scene of Yue 
Yuen’s production, that once occupied a large segment of the province’s economic 
geography, have left en masse7. Firms have resorted to a ‘spatial fix’ (Harvey 2006), 
relocating to other areas of China and Asia, where labor was cheaper. Yue Yuen 
survived in situ only because it possessed sufficient resources to effect organizational 
                                                          
6 Similar to Baran and Sweezy (1969) and Braverman (1974) ‘monopoly capital’ is intended more as an analytical device rather than a 
quantitative measure. In the context of this paper, I propose this theory to outline the meteoric rise of large outsourced firms with 
incredibly high competitive advantages, shifting power relations within the GVC, and opening up new vistas for labor strategies. 
7 
For extended research on strikes and footwear in Guangdong province see Chan (2011). 
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and technological ‘fixes’, mitigating labor costs, while also relocated part of its 
production to Indonesia and Vietnam. As a conglomerate spanning multiple phases of 
the production process, across several countries, Yue Yuen is maturing towards 
oligopolistic power. Although the firm has not acquired full monopoly power, its growth 
represents a trend: a departure from a high DMP GVCs, which saw domestic firms 
simply piggyback on transnational capital, towards low DMP GVCs in which oligopolistic 
suppliers are gaining power in the value chain by growing, vertically-integrating, and 
transnationalising. Oligopoly is better understood as process and not as an anomaly, or 
aberration, but as a logical consequence of competition, and the consolidation it 
engenders. Monopolization ‘is in the DNA of capitalism’ (Foster, McChesney, and Jonna 
2011). 
But what does industrial upgrading and oligopoly power mean for workers? 
Wible, Mervis, and Wigginton (2014) describe Yue Yuen's parent company Pou Chen as 
in league with Apple manufacturer Foxconn, ‘connect[ing] vast underlying commodity 
and labor markets that are relatively hidden from public eye.’ They maintain that this 
‘sprawling web of supply chains can raise living standards, improve conditions for 
workers, and help alleviate poverty.’ Indeed there has been an upsurge in discussion of 
the relationship between the gains to capital, or ‘economic upgrading’, and working 
conditions and benefits, or ‘social upgrading’ (Barrientos et al 2011; Bernhardt and 
Milberg 2011). These debates move away from ‘trickle down’ theories based on the 
axiom that firm growth improves labor conditions. While these recent interventions make 
critical inroads in filling a lacuna within GCC/GVC/GPN frameworks, within much of the 
economic/social upgrading debate there is a failure to recognise the inherent 
antagonism between capital and labor. Indeed as Selwyn (2013) has articulated, the 
literature continues to frame capital-labor relations as mutually beneficial and a causal 
‘top-down’ relationship mediated through elite institution such as the World Bank8. The 
case herein demonstrates that principally, alongside factors such as state policy, the 
combination of consolidation and economic upgrading (material conditions) and the 
sheer dint of force (subjective agency) have resulted in increased share of value for 
labour9.  
                                                          
8 For a critique of attempts at establishing workers’ rights through capitalist institutions see Kumar (2015). 
9  
This emergent organizational fix (or oligopolistic capital) at both production and brand/retail is the result of a combination of the 
geographic limits of the state alongside an emergence of a multipolar economic landscape of power, positions the developmental states 
as a mediator between the dominant ‘fracture’ of transnational brands and domestic suppliers to meld a ‘total’ capital (Mezzedra and 
 13 
While the firm concentration and consolidation increased the rate of exploitation it 
also made the firm more vulnerable to effective labour unrest. Selwyn (2008) applies the 
so-called ‘bullwhip effect’, or small disruptions in one part of a supply chain leading to 
growing disruption elsewhere in the chain, to labour unrest and competition in a global 
context. He cites changes of the global distribution sector which saw the introduction of 
new technologies and the radical reduction of delivery times as central to strategies of 
competitive accumulation. These technological innovations, namely bar codes, high-
speed conveyers with advanced routing and switch controls, reliable laser scanning of 
incoming containers, and increased computing capacities, facilitated ‘time-space 
compression’ with the GVC becoming more interdependent and the result was lean 
production, lead distribution, and just-in-time deliveries.  
A leading example was found in the United Parcels Service (UPS) in which the 
increase emphasis on time put grater downward pressure on workers and increased 
work intensity. But as Selwyn (2008, 164), ‘whilst these innovations, particularly those in 
the labour regime, took place with the acquiescence of labour unions and reflected the 
latter’s weak associational power, it altered but did not diminish workers structural 
power.’ By 1997, the 185,000 UPS Teamsters Union members struck immediately 
crippling UPS’s global supply chain. Within two weeks only 10% of UPS deliveries were 
at normal capacity with the company losing $50m a day. The workers won a 25-35% 
five-year pay rise with the union retaining control of the pension fund. As Selwyn (2008, 
164) concludes ‘for all its global and labor regime restructuring, UPS Achilles heel was 
the capacity of its workforce to withdraw its labor and disrupt the entire UPS supply 
chain. The globalization of the distribution industry supply chain and the decreased 
lead-times only accentuate UPS’ vulnerability’. Similarly, Selwyn (2008, 167) highlights 
a number of successful auto factory strikes in the 1990s stating that ‘workers ability to 
disrupt production is in some ways intensified, precisely because of firms’ attempts at 
time-space compression.’ 
As the case of Yue Yuen demonstrates, the growth of suppliers in labor-intensive 
production does not automatically ‘raise living standards’, but constitutes a dialectical 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Neilson 2013).. Thus, such fractures in capital and distribution of relative surplus value within the supply chain may advantage workers 
to bargain at the point of production. 
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process that results in downward pressure on workers as well as raising the possibility 
for effective workers’ actions. The sheer size of company like Yue Yuen affords it the 
resources to endure minor episodes of labor unrest, outlasting and undermining 
workers, while pressing state and police into service as guarantors of its physical and 
financial stability. Size can prove a liability, however, by amplifying the effects of worker 
actions on value chains where large firms have integrated, fusing together successive 
phases of production. Appelbaum (2008, 82) observes, ‘if production is concentrated in 
a few giant factories, work stoppages can have a significant impact not only on the 
factory itself, which may have significant capital investment, but also on the entire 
supply chain.’ 
Both Merk (2008) and Appelbaum (2008) published papers on the growth of Yue 
Yuen in 2008, six years before the strike, which is the subject of this paper. Schmalz, 
Sommer and Xu (2016) analyze the larger political and demographic explanations for 
the Yue Yeun strike. I build upon these texts, exploring the strike in the context of a 
changing political economy and shifting power dynamics in labor-intensive GVCs. 
 
The Case of Yue Yuen 
Formed in 1969, Taiwanese-based Yue Yuen Industrial (Holdings) Limited has become 
the world’s largest manufacturer of branded casual and athletic footwear, producing 300 
million pairs of shoes a year, or 20% of the global production of sports and casual-wear 
shoes. Over a half million workers man its factories, churning out goods for more than 
30 different brands including Nike, Adidas, Reebok, Puma, Asics, Under Armour, New 
Balance, and Timberland. 
Yue Yuen, a subsidiary of Pou Chen – a conglomerate controlled by the 
billionaire family of Tsai Chi Jue, grew quickly. ‘From slippers, we made sandals. From 
sandals we made shoes. From shoes we made sports shoes,’ recalls a member of Jue’s 
family (Merk 2008, 86). Today the majority of Yue Yuen production is based in China’s 
Pearl River Delta Region (PRD), but facilities can be found as far afield as Vietnam, 
Indonesia, and even the U.S. In recent years Yue Yuen has continued to expand; 
acquiring smaller firms in quick succession, and growing at ~20% per annum throughout 
the 2000s (for reference, the total market for athletic shoes grew only ~10% per annum 
during the same period). Except for Nike and Adidas, Yue Yuen’s profits exceed their 
brands.  
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In the 1970s and 1980s, Yue Yuen became indispensable to industry heavy-
hitters, attracted to its epochal innovations in cost and turn-around time. Indeed, both 
Reebok and Nike would go on to name it their ‘most important producer’ (Merk 2008, 
86). It is during this era that Yue Yuen incorporated the Original Design 
Manufacturer/Original Equipment Manufacturer (ODM/OEM) designation, signalling its 
entrance into the design field, and its ambition to bring all phases of production — from 
conception to distribution — under the Yue Yuen label. By the 1990s it had relocated its 
production facilities from Taiwan to China, Indonesia, and Vietnam. 
Yue Yuen now enjoys the advantages of scale. Assembly takes place in imposing 
facilities that employ as many as 10,000 workers and set the curve for inventory turn-
over, emptying and replenishing stocks of product a full 5 to 20 days faster than industry 
competitors (Merk 2008). And, as it happens in competitive economies, strength has led 
to strength, and out of one advantage—well-leveraged—can develop into another: 
technology. Yew Yuen’s laborers, though already the most numerous, can be said to do 
the least individually in the sector since they operate the most advanced (ergo most 
automated) equipment. While its buyers outsource more and more of their production, 
Yue Yuen expands and deepens its operations, integrating horizontally and vertically, 
and investing heavily in research and development. This has allowed Yue Yuen to 
market itself as a one-stop shop, ‘full package’ to global buyers, handling raw materials, 
assembly, design, and distribution of products. As one Morgan Stanley report noted, the 
‘smaller players without sufficient resources will find it difficult to match Yue Yuen’s 
services to its customers’ (Merk 2008). Valued at a comfortable $5.6 billion Yue Yuen 
‘has emerged as an economic powerhouse in its own right’ (Appelbaum 2008, 73).  
Yet, something is rotten in the state of Yue Yuen. On April 15th, 2014, 43,000 of 
the 60,000 workers employed in its Gaobu factories, in Guongdong Province, downed 
tools and walked off the job. Within two weeks the largest strike of a private company in 
Chinese history10 had drained Yue Yuen of more than $60 million in lost profits and 
exacted benefits.11  
 
                                                          
10 Some strikes in China have caused greater economic damage, in ports or public sector for example, but in terms of number of 
private-sector workers and length of strike Yue Yuen is among the ‘largest recorded industrial disputes in living memory’ (Borromeo 
2014) and the largest at a single company in Chinese history [based on claims in Valdmanis (2014)]. 
11 Yue Yuen workers previously conducted smaller strikes such as in 2008 in Dongguan over wages, with workers refusing to sign their 
contracts, resulting in a company lock-out (Gongchao 2014). 
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A Demand for Social Insurance 
The strike at Yuen Yuen centered on the issue of social insurance. China’s social 
insurance system dates to the early 1980s, and remains an opaque and complicated 
affair that manufacturers either recklessly undermine or simply avoid. Chinese law 
stipulates employees and employers alike are responsible for funding the employee 
social-insurance accounts administered by the local government. Large employers are 
wont to calculate social insurance payments using the minimum wage, while smaller 
employers find it easier to engage in complete non-compliance, and hide in the lower 
end of government priorities. Workers depend on these accounts, which also include 
health, injury, maternity, medical, unemployment compensation insurance, and, 
crucially, pensions for what they hope will be relatively burden-free retirements, often to 
their ancestral villages. Yue Yuen, however, calculated its contribution using a basic 
wage not accounting for overtime. Although the average monthly Yue Yuen wage comes 
to about 3,000 yuan ($490), with the inclusion of overtime pay, workers reported 
employer contributions proportionate to an average of only 1,810 yuan ($296). China’s 
central government confirmed the discrepancy and publicly accused Yue Yuen of 
‘wrongdoing,’ entreating them to take corrective measures. According to Agence 
France-Presse (AFP), labor rights activists had estimated arrears in the range of 100-
200 million yuan ($16-32 million). In light of this, Yue Yuen employee contracts were 
deemed invalid. In 2014 workers discovered that the company had been engaged in the 
practice of miscalculating social insurance for years with, it appeared, the active 
collusion of local government officials. As The Economist (2014) observed, strikers’ 
chants often mingled lyrics highlighting government corruption and complicity with those 
indicted Yue Yuen. 
 Yue Yuen workers complained that ‘the factory has been tricking us for 10 years 
[…] the district government, labor bureau, social security bureau and the company were 
all tricking us together’ (Gongchao 2014). And the problem, it appears, is endemic. 
According to the state newswire Xinhua, local officials often created legal loopholes 
specifically designed to attract capital. ‘Some local governments even allow foreign 
companies to escape payments to attract their investments,’ observes He Gaochao, a 
political scientist at Sun Yat-sen University (Valdmanis 2014). 
Yew Yuen did not back down. Its (alleged) allies in government employed 
aggressive police tactics throughout the strike, detaining, arresting, and even 
hospitalizing protesters. The state newswire, Xinhua, however, reported little of the 
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strike, and contradicted all reports of worker injuries, despite myriad claims by 
international press and activists. Eventually employees, facing threats and an 
overwhelming police presence, began to trickle back in but employed ‘work-to-rule’ 
tactics through work slowdowns.  
But by the strike’s end, workers’ demands had grown to include a new contract, 
better working conditions, better funded government housing, an enshrined right to 
conduct a union election within the plant, concrete assurances against employer 
retribution, and a transparent and accountable government to execute and administer 
all the above. Thus, an economic demand—in this case, honesty in wage reportage 
(that is, pension and social insurance payments in accordance with the law)—give rise 
in due course to further demands, for institutional and social reforms, and would 
consolidate and build upon economic victories.   
 
A Strike Escalates 
The strike had been set off by a Yue Yuen employee who, after putting in her paperwork 
to retire, discovered that her 20+ years of service to the company—in a managerial role, 
no less—had left her with a mere 600 yuan (roughly $100) in social insurance, to 
sustain her through old age. Understandably upset, she stormed off to a company 
dormitory. Word spread.12 
On April 5th, 2014, several hundred workers at a Gaobu factory clocked in and 
promptly walked out; they then gathered at a bridge to block traffic. By April 14th, the 
strikers’ numbers had swollen to 10,000 and come to include workers from all six of Yue 
Yuen’s Gaobu factories—among them even a few contingents from management. 
Though only partial, the strike was already significant in absolute terms, since the 
Gaobu factories accounted for 10% of Yue Yuen’s total output (Qi 2014). An army of riot 
police was dispatched. 
Meanwhile, on the 15th, 43,000 walked out. Yue Yuen responded, offering to sit 
down with workers; negotiations fell through, however, when Yue Yuen refused to 
concede to any of the strikers’ primary demands. ‘It was rumored,’ according to 
workers13, that ‘the company agreed to pay the full social insurance to be calculated 
                                                          
12 Phone Interview, Taiwan-based labour activist August 24th, 2014. Additionally, this account is supported by extensive Reuters 
interviews (Harney and Ruwitch 2014). Some claim company managers orchestrated the strike by encouraging frontline workers to 
walkout (Harney and Ruwitch 2014). 
13 Phone Interview, Francine Chan, Worker Empowerment, August 24th, 2014. 
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from the date that workers returned to work, which would not include back pay, a central 
worker demand. Workers insisted on cash payment since an agreement’s 
implementation was never guaranteed.’ A group of worker representatives were then 
arrested with the purported help of officials of the state union ACFTU (Gongchao 2014). 
On April 17th Yue Yuen announced publicly that it would pay the full social insurance 
calculated from the May 1st, but not retroactively, and this only on condition that workers 
returned to work. 
In the face of this offer, ‘workers [continued] striking, and the numbers … 
probably increased’ despite ‘the factory releas[ing] a notice saying it [would] dismiss the 
workers if they continue[d]’ (AFP 2014). AFP (2014) spoke to a Yue Yuen striker who 
said she and the other workers had been offered the welfare payments until 2016, but 
that she was not satisfied. ‘The factory could just leave in the middle of the year, and we 
might end up without welfare payments.’ 
By Friday, the 18th, the same day that the wives and children of jailed Gaobu 
workers demonstrated in front of the district office, 2,000 Yue Yuen workers in the 
neighboring province of Jiangxi, responsible chiefly for producing Adidas shoes, joined 
the strike and walked out. The spread of the strike occurred without central 
coordination. Labor activist Francine Chan14 described the strike’s propagation, noting 
that, though ‘some workers passed information through the social networking site weibo 
and the instant messaging service qq, [most of] the workers are older [and therefore] 
most of the news spread through word-of-mouth, [since] strike organizers had already 
developed contacts with worker leaders at other Yue Yuen factories during smaller 
strikes in the past.’ Workers were able to circumvent government imposed news 
blackout (The Economist (2014) reported that though foreign journalists were allowed 
onto Yue Yuen’s property at Gaobu, Chinese citizens had been barred).  
On April 21st Yue Yuen made a statement to the Hong Kong stock exchange, 
where it is registered, reassuring investors that it would return calm to the factory floor 
by raising workers’ living allowance to 230 yuan ($37) per month, and promised to make 
up unpaid social security payments, though the contributions was not quantified at the 
time (NDTV 2014). Workers were informed through loudspeaker and fliers distributed by 
ACFTU. As one Taiwan-based labor activist stated,15 ‘workers rejected this offer. It 
sounds nice but workers didn’t know how long they would be working and this was 
                                                          
14 Phone Interview, August 24th, 2014 
15 Phone Interview, July 21st, 2014 
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based on future earnings. The offer was tiny compared to what they were owed and 
couldn’t be enforced by them anyways’. 
The following day factory gates were closed behind workers, to prevent them 
from pressing their timecards (i.e.: and then leaving). Those who did manage to find 
their way inside were arrested when they refused still to work. In response to a call to 
arms by Taiwanese labor activists, a series of demonstrations sprang up in front of 
prominent international Adidas retailers, placing additional—albeit indirect—pressure on 
Yue Yuen. Protests erupted in Istanbul, Melbourne, Bangalore, London, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, New York, and elsewhere. 
By April 24th Yue Yuen had garrisoned its factories with riot police. Four days 
later, the company reported that 80% of the workers employed at the Gaobu factory, 
where the strike had started, had returned to work (Qi 2014). Labor activists and 
workers, however, accused the government and police of physically compelling workers 
return (Yue Yuen, it was said, asked they ‘rectify the situation’). The AFP (NDTV 2014) 
compiled testimonials from workers who claimed to have ‘only returned because of 
intimidation.’ One, who asked not to named, stated, ‘at the moment the factory is 
controlled by police.’  
Eventually the company agreed to pay full pensions, with an additional living 
allowance, starting May 1st, 2014--but no retroactive pay. The offer, announced over 
loudspeakers on Yue Yuen’s corporate campus, elicited ‘howls of derision’ from 
picketers, who tore up copies of the ACFTU mediation letter in response (Economist 
2014). The majority of workers understood this to not be a victory, and the irony involved 
in considering it as such was palpable. Li, a 45-year-old sanitation worker, explained 
(NDTV 2014), ‘the workers were not successful: the government is forcing us back to 
work.’ Tan, a 17-year old worker in the accessories unit: ‘Factory officials have warned 
us that those who make a fuss will be sacked without compensation,’ therefore ‘the 
strike has failed, we didn’t get the result we wanted.’ But misgivings and all, the workers 
accepted and the strike lifted. 
Yue Yuen estimated direct losses from the April 2014 strike at $27 million, with an 
additional $31 million in exacted concessions for 2014 alone (Qi 2014). By May 3rd, 
days after the strike, shares of Yue Yuen had dropped 4.6%, to a 5-month low, Forbes 
conceded that, ‘the strike and extra payments involving Yue Yuen… underscores the 
rising cost of doing business in China, the country’s declining competitiveness for labor-
intensive manufacturing and investment’ (Flannery 2014).  
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Failures or no, its influence was nonetheless felt. On July 21st of the same year, 
workers at a Yue Yuen factory in the Chinese city of Zhuhai in Guangdong Province 
themselves struck over slow social insurance processing, prompting immediate 
corrective measures by company officials. ‘At this point all the misunderstanding has 
been resolved,’ company official Jerry Shum announced shortly after (Lin 2014). In mid-
March 2015, around 5 thousand Yue Yuen workers in the PRD downed tools and 
walked out once again in opposition to the reorganization of the production process. In 
late-March and into April 2015 up to 90,000 footwear factory workers at Yue Yuen’s 
Vietnam subsidiary Pou Yuen went out on weeklong strike, described as ‘one of the 
longest and largest that has ever happened in Vietnam’ (BBC 2015). Their demands 
centered on social insurance distribution - mirrored those of Guangdong workers a year 
earlier, while targeting changes in state policy. In response the Vietnamese government 
announced they would amend the law to incorporate workers’ concerns. Major brands 
reportedly monitored the Vietnam case closely, however production remained unmoved, 
stressing that their deliveries were unaffected by the strike (Barrie 2015). In February 
2016, 17,000 workers at the Bien Hoa City plant struck in opposition to Pou Chen’s 
intransigence with Vietnam’s law requiring 12 days of paid annual leave, and a raft of 
new reward-and-punishment measures, capitulating to workers’ demands after four 
days remunerating workers for strike days (Rogers 2016). 
 
Understanding the GVC through a Strike 
Brand Reaction and Geographic Relocation 
Even before the strike Yue Yuen had begun relocating production inland from China’s 
industrial southeast, away from the region’s rising labor costs (Zhu and Pickles 2014). 
Despite rumors and reports to the contrary (Qi 2014), an Adidas spokesman confirmed 
with me16 the official Adidas statement, that ‘the Adidas Group has a highly flexible 
supply chain in place. [And] in order to minimize the impact on our operations, we are 
currently reallocating some of the future orders originally allocated to Yue Yuen 
Dongguan to other suppliers. At the same time, we’d like to point out that we are not 
pulling out of the Yue Yuen factory in Dongguan and we have no plans to do so. A press 
release by China Labour Watch claiming this is incorrect.’ A few months later it was 
                                                          
16 Email correspondence, Ben Goldhagen, Adidas Marketing Director (UK), April 24th, 2014 
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revealed Adidas had indeed shifted a number of orders to other suppliers but ‘at no 
point did [it] consider pulling out of the factory at Dongguan’ (Borromeo 2014). 
In the waning days of the Yue Yuen strike Nike chief executive Mark Parker 
mentioned at a press conference that Nike was mulling its own relocation of production, 
to follow the path of least worker resistance in China. But though ‘we [i.e.: Nike] didn’t 
move product out in this case, [we’re] staying close to it. We’ve been in a position to do 
that […] we’re always considering it’ and that, despite maintaining ‘close contact’ with 
Yue Yuen, it had ‘not yet taken a position on that’ (Valdmanis 2014). He reassured the 
financial press that Nike had ‘a factory base where [it] can move product around as [it 
needs to, in order to] make sure that [it doesn’t] have issues with production.’ 
However far paying retroactive wages to workers would have gone towards 
rehabilitating its corporate reputation, it was apparently not enough—legal obligations or 
no—and Yue Yuen refused. Presumably, the strike’s end, in Yue Yuen’s eyes, had put a 
cap on its responsibilities to labor. As a case-in-point, Nike’s non-binding code of 
conduct includes a clause protecting worker compensation, asking that, ‘contractor 
employees are timely paid at least the minimum wage required by a country’s law and 
provided legally mandated benefits’ (Valdmanis 2014). Yet Nike made no public 
statements during the strike regarding labor conditions despite protests at their retail-
end across the world, instead reassuring investors on the potential relocation of orders 
in order to resume production.  
Two months after the strike an article in The Guardian (Borromeo 2014) titled, 
‘how Adidas supported worker rights in China factory strike’, analyzed how major brands 
responded to the strike.17 As is commonplace during labor factory fires or collapse in the 
global garment sector, transnational brands immediately disassociated themselves. 
Similarly with Yue Yuen, the brand Timberland, for example, stated that ‘Timberland 
products are manufactured in some Yue Yuen locations…but not in the locations that 
were involved in the strikes’ despite being featured prominently on Yue Yuen’s website. 
While Nike stated it was working closely with Yue Yuen, the company emphasized that 
this was not the brand’s responsibility but an issue between workers, Yue Yuen, and the 
government.  
The most far-reaching statement came from Adidas who stated, ‘throughout the 
strike, the Adidas Group was closely monitoring the situation and in touch with our 
                                                          
17 As an aside, the article series sponsored by brand-retailer giant H&M. 
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partner Pou Chen Group […] Pou Chen Group was in direct discussion with the local 
government and the trade union federation to seek ways to address the concerns 
expressed by the workers […] with respect to the arrest of two workers’ representatives, 
Mr. Zhang and Mr. Lin, we were engaged with several labour groups in Southern China, 
to try to determine where they were being detained and offered our support to secure 
their release. We also wrote to the Dongguan mayoral office, calling for his immediate 
release’ (Borromeo 2014). Adidas’ attempts to place principal responsibility on the 
manufacturer and the local government as well as identifying itself as a third-party 
advocacy group who, alongside labor groups, were lobbying local government rather 
than an intimately enmeshed actor within the forces of production. Nonetheless, the 
recognition by Adidas that a modicum of responsibility must be assumed to ‘address the 
concerns expressed by workers’ is distinct from other brands. Indeed, this may reveal 
the efficacy of the global solidarity campaign of which Adidas was the sole target18.  
 
The State and Social Reproduction 
The Yue Yuen strike represents the most significant private sector strike over pensions 
in Chinese history,19 indicating demographic change and a crisis of social reproduction 
in China. The shifting demand from wages toward pensions, housing, and other forms 
of social care is illustrative of China’s maturing workforce specifically within labour-
intensive manufacturing.  
The age for retirement in China is generally 60 for men and 50 for women and 
the workforce at Yue Yuen are mostly in their 30s and 40s, with many having worked at 
the company for a decade or longer. Seventy-percent of Yue Yuen’s workers are women 
and a similar percentage of the workforce had been employed for five years or longer 
(Gongchao 2014), meaning they had accrued more from their pensions, contrasting with 
the high turnover that plagues worker capacity building in the sector. Across the PRD 
maturing workplaces and fewer younger migrants have forced suppliers to find ways to 
retain employees for longer periods. Consequently, workers shifted away from 
immediate wage-oriented demands, taking stock of a changing landscape of factory 
closure, reorganization, and relocation. The longer a worker is employed the greater the 
                                                          
18 Major brands maintain Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policies including ‘codes of conduct’ protecting legally mandated social 
security. Yet brands either failed to notice (signalling incapacity), or noticed but failed to intervene (implying complicity). Regardless, 
this case contributes to mounting evidence of a failure in the CSR regime (see Kumar and Mahoney 2014).  
19 Based on the assertion by Geoffrey Crothall of the China Labour Bulletin (Economist 2014) 
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potential payoff after a closure or restructure, as such the possibility of closure moves 
social insurance-related demands to the fore amongst a aging workforce. Nearly eight 
months after the end of the Yue Yuen strike, the Wall Street Journal (Magnier 2014) 
highlighted a burgeoning movement of Chinese migrant workers forging demands over 
pensions with workers identifying the Yue Yuen strike and agreement as the ‘turning 
point’ which ‘sparked further worker actions,’ citing a number of strikes and employer 
concessions regarding social insurance for workers at electronics, apparel, and toy 
factories. Ji Jiansheng, a worker at a sports-equipment maker claimed, ‘Yue Yuen’s 
success has made a big difference.’ 
The focus on social benefits is also important for Dongguan’s population where 
nearly 80% of its 8.3m residents either moved in or are children of those who moved 
from other parts of China. Under the hukou system, Chinese law mandates that 
individuals register as either ‘rural’ or ‘urban’, excluding rural-urban workers from state-
subsidized reproduction at their urban residence. This creates a bifurcation between 
urban production and rural social reproduction (Schling 2014). Internal Chinese 
migration results in split-households and so-called ‘left-behind’ children who remain in 
the care of grandparents in the village. Thus China’s internal ‘care chain’ means that 
‘elder care’ is also an issue of ‘child care’, or the generational reproduction of labor 
power (Murphy 2004). Although a Guangdong Province law means that rural migrant 
workers are entitled to some social insurance since the late 1990s (Cheng, Nielsen, and 
Smyth 2014), the fusing of Yue Yuen’s demands around social insurance reveals an 
intersection between spatiality, gender, and an aging industrial working class in the 
PRD20. 
For the past decade the central government has enacted a number of pro-labor 
laws in an attempt to pacify growing worker unrest (Friedman 2014), such as a 2008 
labor law requiring employers contribute to social security. The Yue Yuen strike coheres 
with Friedman’s (2014) characterization of labor unrest in China as a form of ‘alienated 
politics’ with workers unable to articulate larger politics despite antagonism towards their 
employer, local government, and the ACFTU. Yet, contrary to Friedman’s claims, the 
strike spread to other factories and provinces, effectively communicating demands 
internally and to the outside world despite a media blackout, and is therefore not entirely 
‘cellularized’. Yue Yuen also represents an example of a trend in the PRD of demands 
                                                          
20 In Western China there is an expansion of vocational schools which function as a ‘labor fix’ for relocated factories of the PRD. 
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for full implementation of the law. Lee and Zhang (2013, 1504) have shown the use of 
force has become undesirable as the market economy has reduced a popular 
dependence on the authoritarian state. They maintain that the Chinese government 
developed a catalogue of measures to manage unrest, allowing a spaced for aggrieved 
citizens to obtain material concessions and symbolic rewards from the state which they 
term ‘bargained authoritarianism.’ It is clear that the state is changing tact from 
authoritarian to more clandestine means of reaching governmentality; that is to say, the 
Chinese state has taken on a more ‘paternalistic’ character and less manifestly 
antagonistic to workers’ demands.  
 
Too Big To Annul 
GVCs are not static and just as ‘the increase[ed] disaggregation of value chains […] 
allowed  new kinds of lead firms to capture value’ (Pickles and Smith 2016, 25) so too 
consolidation into large capital holding firms allow new kinds of footwear supplier firms 
to capture value21. Yue Yuen represents an ‘ideal type’ of this phenomenon whose size, 
integrated supply chains, and technologically upgraded factories led to reduced lead 
times and costs, aggregating the price differentials with its closest competitors, and 
making it increasingly prohibitive for buyers to adopt alternative suppliers. Through 
consolidation Yue Yuen has accumulated considerable value in a historically low-value 
sector, which is reinvested into industrial upgrading, helping reinforcing its market share, 
to erect insurmountable barriers to entry. Consequently, these firms exert greater 
influence in the GVC.  
The power of footwear brands rests in their capacity to seamlessly move 
production at little cost but with devastating effects on producers and workers (see 
Moran 2010; Armbruster-Sandoval 2004). Despite brand assurances to investors of 
their capacity to replace Yue Yuen, the unwillingness or inability for them to relocate a 
noticeable proportion of their production from Yue Yuen, despite an increased risk of 
resurgent and costly labor unrest, is one indicator of Yue Yuen’s power in the GVC. 
Brands retaining production after the strike’s end is unprecedented in the history of 
                                                          
21 The use of enhanced value in the case of Yue Yuen can be inferred by bringing together a range of factors such as upgrading, 
consolidation, and that Yue Yuen’s gross profits surpassed all but two of the over thirty brands it supplies for. As with other studies of 
consolidation in GCC/GVC/GPNs (see Appelbaum 2008; Azmeh and Nadvi 2014), the utility of ‘value capture’ in this paper is primarily 
at a conceptual level (for a more comprehensive analysis of the spatialized and contextualized conceptual understanding of value 
capture in production networks see Pickles and Smith (2016)). 
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global garment sector where relocation follows even the mildest labor unrest (see 
Kumar and Mahoney 2014). The growth of firms like Yue Yuen makes replacing it 
increasingly onerous. The size, in terms of net profits, of Yue Yuen now exceeds almost 
all of the branded firms it produces for22. The effect of which should not be understated. 
The ability of buyers to dictate terms to suppliers has as much to do with barriers to 
entry as it does with monetary power. In addition to capacity, an obstacle to relocating 
production is intellectual property, further evidence of embeddedness of transnational 
brands with domestic firms. Teresa Cheng, a labor activists, posited23 that ‘similar to 
Foxconn and Apple, brands could see the critical importance of keeping design 
functions within a trusted producer like Yue Yuen.’ This represents a radical departure 
from previous brand action in the sector and cannot be separated from the emergence 
of so-called ‘full package’ producer like Yue Yuen. Furthermore, by developing 
ODM/OEM design capability, Yue Yuen has expanded into a higher-value phases in the 
supply chain. As one director at a large Hong Kong shoe supplier reportedly told the 
Wall Street Journal, ‘If Yue Yuen said today ‘I wont supply anymore to Nike’ then Nike 
would be scared’ (Merk 2008, 88).  
While major brands are outsourcing tasks, Yue Yuen is insourcing more of it, 
moving upstream on the global commodity chain. Large full package agreements, like 
Nike’s, of which Yue Yuen is the sole manufacturer worldwide, functions to steel-
reinforce the high barrier to entry for competitors. Consequently, Nike and Yue Yuen 
have become ‘highly dependent on one another’ (Appelbaum 2008, 80), giving Yue 
Yuen greater leverage when negotiating agreements with brands. Over time this 
relationship becomes irreversible, with competing firms becoming absorbed into the 
whole or vanishing altogether, as Marx24 (1867, 435) anticipated, that the ‘laws of the 
centralization of capitals […] larger capitals beat the smaller [and] it always ends in the 
ruin of many small capitalists, whose capitals partly pass into the hands of their 
conquerors, partly vanish.’ The result is a deepening of Yue Yuen’s power to dictate 
prices, dramatically reconfiguring the Gereffi’s ‘buyer-driven’ paradigm into a kind of 
buyer-producer symbiosis. This new mutually dependent relationship makes identifying 
the driver of GVCs difficult and, as the Yue Yuen strike illustrates, forces larger buyers 
to buttress their relationship with suppliers despite growing liability brought on by labour 
                                                          
22 Based on annual Yue Yuen and brand report data (retrieved April 24th, 2016) 
23 Phone Interview, July 15th, 2014 
24 For an elaboration on the tensions between GCC/GVC/GNN approaches and the Marxian ‘law of value’ see Starosta (2010). 
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unrest. Symbiosis within the value chain is part of a larger trend of economic growth and 
purchasing power within emerging markets and falling consumption patterns within 
saturated economies. As Henderson et al (2002, 450) state, ‘the source of power within 
the GPNs and the ways in which it is exercised is decisive for value enhancement and 
capture and thus for the prospects for development and prosperity.’ 
Thus, Yue Yuen’s fully integrated supply chains brought under one roof 
competitively higher-volume production ready for market at considerable cost-savings. 
Yue Yuen’s capacity expanded so significantly that if Nike or Adidas chose to go directly 
to a standalone production firm in China instead of a supply-chain integrated firm 
because ‘the organizational costs might be too high to afford’ (Lo, Wu, and Hsu 2014). 
Notably, despite its means, expertise, and strategic position Yue Yuen has not produced 
its own brand. Doing so, despite the potential profits, would turn Yue Yuen from high 
value supplier into direct competitor with its vital branded clients. Such is the 
relationship between Yue Yuen and the brands it produces for, but one that is always 
changing.   
 
Workers’ Power 
Industrial geography informs labor-capital relations at Yue Yuen’s primary facilities. 
Despite Guangdong housing 20% of China production, recent years has witnessed 
rising production costs due in part to labor shortage. Yet, through consolidation and 
upgrading Yue Yuen retained much of its production in Guangdong, unlike many other 
labor-intensive manufacturing firms. Labor shortage optimized conditions for an 
escalation of labor demands. In what Hobsbawm (1952) calls ‘collective bargaining by 
riot,’ Yue Yuen workers cannot mediate their concerns through an independent union. 
What they have is a single official union ACFTU utilized, as Pringle (2013) and Howell 
(2008) have shown, to stifle their militancy. The risks of organizing such strikes are too 
high, due to government spies or company-side informers, so they take on a 
‘spontaneous’25 character, based on word of mouth, erupting and fizzling-out with equal 
precision. 
The size and longevity of the Yue Yuen strike is unprecedented in labor-intensive 
sectors. Particularly remarkable is a singular demand coalesced against a single target 
utilizing the same tactic – the wildcat strike - across different factories, provinces, and 
                                                          
25 ‘Spontaneity’ of strikes is addressed in Leung (2015) through first hand accounts of labor struggles in the jewel sector in Guangzhou. 
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even countries over time, rebutting the claim that ‘[In China] when workers do protest 
collectively, it almost never extends beyond a single workplace’ (Friedman 2014, 
1002)26. The strike reveals changes in labor-capital relations not only in global footwear 
but also across labor-intensive manufacturing. These sectors once consisted of many 
small factories where workers’ demands were atomized, a notable difference to Yuen 
Yuen where demands cohered against a single employer albeit in uneven ways. Striking 
workers had an intuitive sense of Yue Yuen’s power in the global supply chain and the 
efficacy of a large and escalating strike. Once the strike began at Gaobu, a historically 
militant factory, it expanded to other factories and provinces despite a rejection of the 
official government union, with neighboring strikes emerging even after the original 
strike had ended. For example Yue Yuen HQ immediately capitulated to workers at the 
Zhuhai facility who struck for social insurance a few months after the end of the main 
strike, extending the counter hegemonic power of the original strike to make gains for 
the Chinese working class beyond a set time or space.  
Enhanced value capture at suppler-ends begins to change workers’ strategies 
and tactics. As stated earlier the employer contribution to social insurance is often under 
calculated by larger employers and completely avoided by smaller firms. The profit 
margins of Yue Yuen motivated workers to action, as one activists27 aptly captures this 
relationship, ‘I’ve never seen social insurance as a demand at smaller companies where 
there are many other difficulties, workers I spoke to on the Yue Yuen strike knew exactly 
how much the company was worth and the issue that drove them was knowing the 
company could easily pay them.’ Indeed, there is much evidence that demonstrates the 
increases in value and investment at the point of production influences the bargaining 
power of workers. Moody (2017, 56) states, ‘like the formation of larger firms along 
definite industrial lines, greater capital intensity offers expanded opportunities for 
successful direct action and increased power in collective bargaining’ (Moody 2017, 56). 
This is in the same vein as Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen (2018, 87) writing of GVCs in 
labour-intensive sectors, ‘if suppliers earn lower unit rates over time, workers also tend to 
receive lower wages. If suppliers must reduce lead times, workers will have to engage in 
overtime work. Thus, the optimum point for suppliers and workers is inherently linked.’ 
Further, Anwar Shaikh (2016, 751) writes, ‘capital-intensive industries will also tend to have 
                                                          
26 Similarly the 2010 Honda ‘strike wave’ spread across the country coalescing around wage demands and for an independent union. 
However, automobiles remain capital-intensive and as such different workers’ bargaining power than that of footwear. 
27 Phone Interview, July 21s, 2014 
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high levels of fixed costs which will make them more susceptible to the effects of slowdowns 
and strikes. At the same time, because labour costs are likely to be a smaller portion of their 
total costs, such industries are able to tolerate wage increases’. 
 
Conclusion 
The conventional wisdom of capital flows in footwear production is that profits are 
predicated on the global ‘race to the bottom’ where employers are able to choose from 
an almost unlimited number of producers in an arena with low barriers to entry. 
However, as I’ve argued here, freer capital flows can contribute to the vanishing of 
smaller firms and an even great enlargement of enormous suppliers. Greater bargaining 
power for suppliers in the GVC can change the possibilities for workers. Whereas a 
strike at a smaller firm would signal its death knell, Yue Yuen’s size means it can absorb 
much of the liability brought on by labor unrest. This is indicated by both the $27m cost 
of the strike, the company’s ability to ensure the obedience of local officials and police, 
as well as the inability of brands to either effectively pressure Yue Yuen or move 
production significantly. However, as an outgrowth of Yue Yuen’s capacity it was able to 
agree to $31m in workers’ benefits. Despite the failures of the strike and continued 
reported difficulties in ensuring the enforcement of the agreement the levels of 
compensation was unparalleled in the sector28.  
Through an ‘organizational fix’, an integration of once exogenous phases in the 
value chain, and the emergence of new large-scale oligopolistic network and territorially 
embedded firms in the sector is resulting in supplier-end upgrading, raising 
insurmountable barriers to entry and calling into question established orthodoxy. These 
economies of scale that form out of the transition towards oligopolistic power has the 
effect of changing the oligopsonistic relationship between global buyers and producer 
into a buyer-producer symbiosis, adding restraints to a historically footloose capital, and 
may someday help grind this ‘race’ to a halt. By technological upgrading, organizational 
consolidation, and even relational rents, firms like Yue Yuen are ‘locking-in’ buyers, 
resulting in enhanced value capture at the bottom of the global value chain, of which its 
                                                          
28 Hitherto footwear workers of Global South coordinated with Global North activists targeting spaces of high value capture in the 
supply chain – the brands. The Yue Yuen strike reveals changes in consumption patterns and points of leverage. During the Yue Yuen 
strike storefront solidarity actions against Adidas erupted around the globe, and in a significant departure the Yue Yuen strike saw 
retail targeted in cities of the Global South exposing the growth of Asia’s proportion of global consumption (Russell 2014). Thus 
the emergence of multipolar world in which products are produced and consumed within the Global South hints at the prospect of 
multiple points of leverage for workers. It also counters the claim by Anner (2015) that China’s ‘authoritarian state labor control 
regime’ prevents links between workers international advocacy groups and workers. 
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profit margins are but one indicator, opening up a space for workers to finally make 
material demands on their direct employer. Simultaneously, however, the transformation 
to higher value capitals allow them to materially withstand sufficient economic pressure, 
such as undermining industrial action through its ability to absorb losses brought on by 
strikes, as well wielding greater influence with the state apparatus, such as province 
officials and the police, in reproducing labor power. 
 Yet, it would seem that Yue Yuen strike, by pressing for labor-law compliance are 
largely ‘defensive’ and it is still unclear if any enduring organization develops from it 
despite its clear influence on further strike actions and China’s migrant workers’ 
demands for social security. Indeed, the strike at Yue Yuen may represent another 
example of what Chan (2010) has called ‘class struggle without class organization.’ 
However as the strike progressed and additional demands were added the strike on a 
more ‘offensive’ or proactive character similar to what Elfstrom and Kuruvilla (2014) 
have described in Guangdong’s capital-intensive automobile industry. Still, the Chinese 
state’s reaction remains inconsistent, in some instances they stand aside during 
workers’ strikes while in the case of Yue Yuen they returned to their authoritarian 
practices with a vengeance. 
 However, questions of capital flows are live ones. Since 2012 Pou Chen has 
continued to move production internally out of South China to Vietnam (a process that 
has only intensified following the introduction of the Transatlantic Trade Partnership 
(TPP) in 2015), but there is no indication brands have sought alternative producers to 
Pou Chen (Ting Fang 2015)29. In 2016 Adidas unveiled a robot-operated, vertically 
integrated, large-scale ‘speedfactory’ in Ansbach, Germany, announcing future plants in 
Britain and France, with Nike also developing its own robot-operated shoe factory (AFP 
2016). As a direct consequence of rising costs in Asia, Adidas and Nike are replacing 
humans with machines and ‘returning’ production to Europe, where shoes will be 
produced faster, with quicker turnaround times, and significantly reducing freight and 
labor costs. 
Additional research is needed on how economic changes in China are effecting 
the spatial, technological and organizational reconstitution of capital in labor-intensive 
production. The Yue Yuen strike draws an initial picture, namely of a restless maturing 
Chinese industrial working class with greater bargaining power against a vertically 
                                                          
29 Consequently, Vietnam has seen a dramatic increase in its footwear production (see Phan, Pham, and 
Pham (2016).  
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integrated and enlarged domestic capital. In a strategy that traces its roots to the early 
2000s, private sector workers are utilizing a legal framework by which to uphold their 
demands, and these demands are now spreading to other factories against a single 
enemy. Finally, economic leverage has spread out of the factory and against retailers, 
not only with allies in the Global North but by garments workers themselves in the 
Global South through person-to-person connections and material solidarity made 
possible by the emergence of a global consumer class. Thus fortifying the bonds 
between workers across the region, making a development of workers struggles to meet 
the development of capital. For as Marx (1848) stated, ‘the real fruit of their battles lies, 
not the immediate result, but in the ever-expanding union of the workers.’ 
Thus, greater value-capture at the producer-end is dramatically altering 
questions of power and production. The Yue Yuen strike is a sign, a shift away from 
giant oligopolistic footwear brands placing downward pressure on a seemingly endless 
reserve of small, powerless suppliers with an army of workers left unable to exert 
power. The case of Yue Yuen demonstrates that workers help shape the actions of the 
state, which attempts to placate them through legislation, and capital: by driving up 
labor costs and forcing vertical and horizontal integration, moving the struggle to the 
more direct and brutal organizational fixes, which are clearly in the workers’ court: the 
point of production itself.  
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